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Abstract 
This policy paper examines the conflicting objectives of EU conditionality in relation to Roma in the 
aftermath of introducing visa-free travel for the Western Balkans, studying the case of North 
Macedonia. Since the eastern enlargement, EU conditionality on Roma has gradually advanced in terms 
of both the acceding countries and EU member states. At the same time, the pressures to curb migration 
in the EU have inadvertently affected the position of Roma. In acceding countries from the Western 
Balkans, the tension between these two trends has been clearly illustrated with the EU and national 
responses to the rise of the number of asylum seekers in the EU from this region. Looking at the case of 
North Macedonia, the paper shows how national authorities, in response to EU member state requests, 
have instituted practices at the national level that have led to a violation of the rights of the Roma 
community, by limiting their freedom to exit the country.  
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1. Introduction and rationale  
This policy brief examines the conflicting objectives of EU conditionality in relation to Roma in 
the case of the Republic of North Macedonia. EU conditionality for the purposes of this brief 
denotes “the offer of positive incentives (such as EU membership) as a reward for states [that] 
meet the EU’s demands to adopt certain rules” (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 9). The mechanism of 
conditionality was most extensively developed for the eastern enlargement of the EU, since 
prior to the 1990s there was no proper monitoring of conditions for accession to the EU, 
especially in relation to the political criteria (Pridham, 2007).  
Since the eastern enlargement, EU conditionality on Roma has gradually advanced in terms of 
both the acceding countries and EU member states. At the same time, the pressures to curb 
migration in the EU have inadvertently affected the position of Roma. In acceding countries 
from the Western Balkans, the tension between these two trends has been clearly illustrated 
with the EU and national responses to the rise of the number of asylum seekers from this region 
in the EU. Faced with increasing burdens on their respective administrations, affected EU 
member states (most notably Belgium and Germany) demanded that the governments of the 
Western Balkans take action to stop the rise of the number of asylum seekers (Sommo, 2011). 
In 2012, the German authorities announced that 80–90% of the Western Balkan asylum 
claimants were Roma and classified them as false or economic asylum seekers.1 In response, 
the issue quickly became defined in relation to the ethnic/racial background of the people 
exiting these countries and measures were sought and implemented to limit the freedom of 
movement of Roma specifically.  
Having these developments in mind, this brief undertakes a case study of North Macedonia in 
the aftermath of the visa-free travel decisions of 2009–10. The country is an instructive 
example due to the long-term engagement with the EU institutions, extensive scope of 
measures limiting the freedom of movement of Roma resulting in more than 50 court cases 
and numerous verdicts confirming discrimination,2 and the explicit recognition of 
discriminatory practices by national authorities.3 Similar trends can be noted at various points 
in time in most of the other countries of the region, notably Serbia and most recently Albania.  
The structure of this policy brief is as follows: first, it provides a background to the policy issue, 
examining two distinct tracks in which Roma policies are approached at the EU level. These 
include (i) the perspective of integration/inclusion both in the EU and in enlargement countries 
and (ii) a migratory, i.e. security, perspective in response to the rise of numbers of asylum 
seekers in the EU. The background to the policy issue is followed by the case study, illustrating 
                                                     
1 See H. Heuser, “Blitzverfahren – German Asylum Procedures for Roma from Western Balkan Countries” in “Going 
Nowhere? Western Balkan Roma and EU Visa Liberalisation”, Roma Rights, 1/2014, 1 October 2014. 
2 See European Policy Institute & KHAM, “Right to Equality and Freedom of Movement at Borders: Experiences in 
Providing Legal Assistance”, Skopje and Delcevo, 2016, http://epi.org.mk/docs/Sloboda%20na%20dvizenje%20-
%20iskustva%20od%20pravna%20pomosh_MK.pdf. 
3 Ministry of the Interior, “Spasovski: The discrimination of Roma at border crossing points cannot be allowed”, 
Press Release, 2 November 2016, http://mvr.gov.mk/vest/2894. 
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the conflicting objectives of EU conditionality on Roma from the two perspectives discussed 
above. Last, the paper draws its conclusions and the significance of this conflict of priorities.  
2. Background to the issue  
2.1 Roma as an element of EU accession conditionality  
The situation of Roma became an element of EU conditionality in the latter half of the 1990s, 
as a result of international advocacy efforts and the increasing number of Roma asylum seekers 
from central and eastern Europe in the EU (Vermeersch, 2003). Empirical analysis of the role of 
the EU in the development and implementation of Roma policies has been inconclusive. On the 
one hand, it has been widely accepted that the development of “pro-Romani policies gained 
momentum during the accession negotiations”. Similarly, Swimelar (2008) concludes that 
minority rights for Roma in the accession process “have become institutionalised, empowered 
in the public realm, and generally accepted as appropriate at the elite level” (p. 519). On the 
other hand, Vermeersch (2003) concludes that the policy changes, especially in relation to 
Roma, were predominantly a result of short-term political considerations.  
Since the big-bang enlargement and largely as a result of it, the EU has also been instituting its 
own rules and policies on Roma integration. This includes the obligation for EU member states 
to adopt and implement National Roma Integration Strategies (NRIS) in line with an existing EU 
framework for this purpose, developed as an EU response to the forced evictions and 
expulsions of EU Roma citizens by the French and Italian governments in 2010.4 Recent studies 
have highlighted that the EU NRIS framework “fails to properly address systemic challenges to 
the rule of law and structural barriers erected by all state institutions in the EU Member States 
as well as malpractices such as the continued forced evictions and returns of both Roma EU 
citizens and Roma non-EU asylum seekers, the use of camps and segregation of Roma 
communities” (Carrera et al., 2017, p. 28). According to the same analysis, Commission officials 
also shared the view that the strategy cannot address the systemic violations of the EU law. A 
2018 evaluation of these strategies in their first cycle found that despite progress in some areas, 
most notably education, “discrimination continues to be of high concern in European societies” 
(European Commission, 2018c, p. 20).  
In parallel, the European Commission has also been working in the context of enlargement 
countries by including Roma policies as an element of the political criteria for accession, but 
also in relation to social policy and anti-discrimination as well as fundamental rights. As a result, 
Roma have been a topic of the EU annual reports on the countries in the Western Balkans. The 
reports have outlined in detail the monitoring of various conditions and “provided the basis for 
                                                     
4 For a background on this see: A. Geddes and P. Scholten, The politics of migration and immigration in Europe, 
Sage, 2016. 
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enlargement decisions by other EU executive institutions” (Pridham, 2007, p. 453).5 Using these 
documents, the EU has stipulated its own conditionality through the standard instruments of 
accession, i.e. the annual reports and their follow-up. Lastly, Roma and the need for promotion 
of their social inclusion are included in the Commission’s Communication on enlargement of 
February 2018 (European Commission, 2018a). 
2.2 Roma as (false) asylum seekers  
Following the (re)introduction of visa-free travel for short stays for the citizens of the Western 
Balkans in 2009 and 2010, as noted in the introduction, Roma were singled out by EU member 
states as false asylum claimants. In 2012, the German asylum bureau issued statements that 
80–90% of the Western Balkan asylum claimants were Roma and classified them as false or 
economic asylum seekers (Heuser, 2014). Similar numbers were included in the UNHCR’s 
report on asylum, according to which 92% of all asylum applicants in Germany originating from 
Serbia and Kosovo were of Roma origin.6 These statements were accompanied by official 
releases of the Federal Ministry of Interior, which requested immediate termination of the 
massive inflow of Macedonian and Serbian citizens, instigating an aggressive media campaign 
as well, coupled with frequent visits from high-level representatives of EU member states to 
the region (Heuser, 2014).  
As a result of this increase and pressure from the member states affected, at the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council of 8 November 2010 the EU established a post-visa liberalisation 
monitoring mechanism, including representatives of Frontex, Europol, the current and 
incoming Council Presidency, and the Secretariat of the Police Cooperation Convention for 
South-East Europe (European Commission, 2011a). As part of this mechanism the Commission 
started issuing reports on the post-visa liberalisation monitoring and produced a total of five 
reports, with the last one in January 2015.7 Simultaneously, Frontex in its first Western Balkans 
annual risk analysis of 2010 registered the increase in unfounded asylum claims and attributed 
them "to ethnic Albanian or Roma community members from Serbia and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, travelling legally to the mentioned EU Member States and citing socio-
economical reasons for their asylum claims" (Frontex, 2010). Between 2011 and 2014, the 
‘abuse’ of the visa-free travel scheme by Western Balkan nationals had already been 
determined as a migratory risk in all annual Frontex reports.  
The ethnic distribution of asylum seekers was included already in the first reports of the 
European Commission on the post-visa liberalisation monitoring. In its first report of 2011, the 
Commission assessed that "as regards the ethnic background and geographical distribution, an 
estimated 80% of all asylum seekers from Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
                                                     
5 The importance of the progress reports as an essential reference source of conditionality has been confirmed in 
research and discussions with stakeholders, including at the EU and national levels. 
6 See http://www.unhcr.org/5149b81e9.html, footnote 14. 
7 The reports on the post-visa liberalisation monitoring were discontinued at the height of the migration/refugee 
crisis.  
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Macedonia were Roma (Romani speaking)” (emphasis added) (European Commission, 2011a). 
According to this report, their main reason for leaving their country of origin is economic, based 
on false perceptions of financial advantages that they will acquire by requesting asylum in 
certain member states (ibid.). In the second report of December 2011, the Commission 
determines the existence of a profile of the asylum seekers with the following description: “the 
vast majority of the claims stems from persons belonging to the Roma minority, who often 
arrive with their families” (emphasis added) (European Commission, 2011b). In the same 
report, the Commission notes that "between 22 August and 18 September 2011 the share of 
citizens of Roma origin is as follows: 100% for Albania, 100% for Montenegro, 92% for Serbia, 
88% of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 71% for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" 
(emphasis added) (European Commission, 2011b).  
To deal with these cases specifically, most of the affected countries introduced expedited 
procedures for asylum seekers, including Norway and Germany. In August 2012, the German 
authorities established a Western Balkans support unit, manned by seconded staff focusing 
exclusively on applications from these countries, reducing the asylum processing time from 40 
to 10 days. In this procedure the applicant’s interview is held on the same day as the asylum 
application (or two days afterwards at the latest), and the decision on whether protection is 
accorded or not is submitted within one week, not leaving time for preparation.8 The average 
duration of the interview is only 40 minutes, and the formal 25 questions concerning name, 
origin, family, etc., take approximately 30 minutes of that time, with couples interviewed 
together. Research has argued that these discriminatory interviews resulted in 100% negative 
decisions submitted with the added comment that the applications were “obviously 
unsubstantiated”.9 
In September 2015, the European Commission proposed to replace the national safe lists with 
an EU common list of safe countries of origin.10 This move followed the 2014 decision of the 
German Bundestag to place Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the national list 
of safe countries of origin. The Commission’s proposal would “enable Member States to apply 
specific procedural rules, in particular accelerated asylum and border procedures, where the 
applicant is a national of a country that has been designated as a safe country of origin by 
national law”.11 Among the countries included in the European Commission’s proposal are 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, 
                                                     
8 H. Heuser, “Blitzverfahren – German Asylum Procedures for Roma from Western Balkan Countries”, 
http://www.errc.org/article/roma-rights-1-2014-going-nowhere-western-balkan-roma-and-eu-visa-
liberalisation/4325/9. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/proposal_for_regulation_of_the_ep_and_council_establishing_an_eu_common_list_of_safe_cou
ntries_of_origin_en.pdf. 
11 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-european-list-
of-safe-third-countries-of-origin. 
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Serbia and Turkey, which are designated as safe countries of origin within the meaning of 
Directive 2013/32/EU.12 Though the proposal is still under discussion, the Western Balkan 
states have since been included on most of the national lists of safe countries of origin.13  
3. Case study: EU pressure to advance and limit the rights of Roma in the Republic 
of North Macedonia 
According to the 200214 census, the Republic of North Macedonia has 2,022,547 inhabitants, 
of whom 53,879 or 2.66% declare themselves as Roma, but according to unofficial election data 
the number is much higher. Contestation over numbers is a common feature of Roma policy 
across the EU as well (see Guild and Carrera, 2013). According to the report of the Roma 
Education Fund, the unofficial number of Roma in the country is 135,490,15 or 6.77% of the 
total population. In line with practices across the region, the country adopted one of the first 
Strategies for Roma in 2004,16 revised twice since then,17 and was also a signatory of the Decade 
of Roma Inclusion adopted in 2005. Roma are included regularly in the EU progress reports as 
a point of concern in the country. For specifically monitoring Roma policies, the Commission 
established Roma seminars for regular review and follow-up. When looking at the assessments 
of the European Commission, as also confirmed through interviews, there is repetition in terms 
of the need to advance the inclusion of Roma in all policy areas, including education, housing, 
health and social protection.  
While requesting an improvement in the situation of Roma across policy fields, responses to 
the rise in the number of asylum seekers in EU member states at both the EU and national 
levels post-2009 illustrate a parallel process of securitisation of this community. In the first year 
after the visa liberalisation, Macedonia was listed as a major country of origin of asylum 
seekers, with the highest relative increase at more than 599% (UNHCR, 2011). As was reported 
by Der Spiegel, in the case of Germany in 2010, asylum requests from Macedonia and Serbia 
together accounted for 7,444 applications, whereas a year earlier, just 690 applicants came 
from these two countries (Angelos, 2011). According to the European Stability Initiative, 
                                                     
12 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/proposal_for_regulation_of_the_ep_and_council_establishing_an_eu_common_list_of_safe_cou
ntries_of_origin_en.pdf. 
13 See European Commission, European Migration Network, “Safe Countries of Origin”, March 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/00_inform_safe_country_of_origin_final_en_1.pdf. 
14 See the State Statistical Office, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia 
2002, Skopje, 2005, http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga_13.pdf. 
15 Roma Education Fund, “Needs Assessment Study for the Roma Education Fund”, Background Paper, Paris, 2004, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTROMA/Resources/NAReportFinalMacedonia.pdf. 
16 Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Strategy for Roma in the Republic of Macedonia, 2005, Republic of 
Macedonia, Skopje, 2005, http://www.mtsp.gov.mk/wbstorage/files/strategija_romi.pdf. 
17 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in cooperation with the National Coordinator of the Decade and the 
Strategy for Roma, Strategy for Roma in Macedonia 2014–2020, Skopje, 2014, 
http://www.mtsp.gov.mk/content/pdf/strategii/Strategija%20za%20Romite%20vo%20RM%202014-2020.pdf. 
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Germany was the first destination for asylum seeking from the Western Balkans, with 36% in 
2010 rising to 76% of all asylum claims from the region in 2014.18 Similar trends were noticeable 
in Sweden and Belgium as well.  
In response to these trends, in May 2011 Belgium sent a letter to the European Commission 
suggesting a suspension of the visa-free regime with Serbia if the latter did not undertake 
necessary measures. Similar messages were sent to Macedonia as well, with high-level EU 
officials regularly visiting the country in order to ‘warn’ the authorities and the local 
population.19 The rise of the number of asylum seekers from these countries instigated further 
action at the EU level with proposals for introducing a safeguard clause to suspend visa 
liberalisation (European Commission, 2011c). In practice, the requirement to decrease the 
number of asylum seekers from the region, with a focus on Roma, became an (informal or 
unofficial) element of EU conditionality.20 High-level officials highlighted that between 2011 
and 2015, the national authorities were under strong political pressure to reduce the number 
of potential asylum seekers coming from the country.21 In the same interview, it was confirmed 
that at high-level meetings, representatives of the European Commission and of EU member 
states actively used the threat of suspending the visa-free regime in order to achieve that goal.  
To respond to the requirements, the government devised statutory solutions for criminalising 
the abuse of the visa-free regime and under pressure began a practice of profiling potential 
asylum seekers upon exit from the country. In relation to the former, changes were introduced 
in 2011 that provided for revoking passports for the period of one year for Macedonian citizens 
who had been deported from another state, later declared unconstitutional in 2014. Yet, the 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) had "documented 75 cases in which Macedonian border 
officials revoked the passports of Romani individuals who had been deported from EU countries 
as failed asylum seekers, and became aware of another 155 such cases" (ERRC, 2015). Similar 
measures had been introduced in Bulgaria and Romania in the early 2000s.22 In Bulgaria 
specifically, Tchorbadjiyska argued that the possibility for revoking the passports of those who 
have infringed on other states’ entry and residence rules might be challenged as a limitation to 
their freedom to move (Tchorbadjiyska, 2007).  
The second, major group of measures consists of enhanced controls upon exit from the country. 
The enhanced controls were based on a telegram sent from the Ministry of the Interior to the 
                                                     
18 See European Stability Initiative, “New facts and figures on Western Balkan Asylum Seekers”, 6 April 2015, 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/New%20facts%20and%20figures%20on%20WB%20asylum%20claims%206%20April
%202015.pdf. 
19 Confirmed in interviews with the author.  
20 Confirmed in interviews with the author. 
21 Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2016.  
22 In the case of Romania, “the entering or leaving a foreign state by the illegal passing of its borders, committed 
by a Romanian citizen or by a person without citizenship residing on the Romanian territory is considered as an 
offence and is punished with imprisonment from 3 months to 2 years”, Art. 1(1), Emergency Ordinance no. 112, 
Referring to the Punishment of Some Action Committed Abroad by Romanian Citizens or by [a] Person Without 
Citizenship Residing in Romania, 30 August 2001 (Official Gazette of Romania, no. 549, 3 September 2001). 
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relevant services requesting that “controls upon exit from the territory of the Republic of 
Macedonia of organized groups of citizens, potential asylum seekers, are to be enhanced, 
especially in light of provisions of Article 15 of the Law on Border Control (Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Macedonia No. 171, dated 30 December 2010)”.23 In practice, this measure 
implied that the border police would conduct stricter controls upon exit, as was confirmed by 
interviewees as well. As documented by various international and national observers, these 
measures primarily targeted the Roma community. For example, according to the report of the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, between December 2009 and the end of 
November 2012, about 7,000 Macedonian citizens were not allowed to leave the country, with 
Roma clearly disproportionately affected.24 The US Department of State reports that in 2011 
alone, during a seven-month period, more than 1,500 Macedonian citizens, mostly Roma, were 
refused exit from the country on the basis of being potential asylum seekers.25 Furthermore, 
according to the same source after just one year the number of Macedonian citizens who were 
denied exit from the country increased from 1,500 in 2011 to 8,322 in 2012.26 The number of 
exit refusals was observed by the European Commission and Frontex, noting that in 2013 the 
number of refusals of exit was 6,700 or 41% more compared with 2012 (Frontex, 2014). The 
ERRC in its work has confirmed that in 90% of the cases only Roma were asked for evidence to 
justify why they were travelling (i.e. in cases when Roma and non-Roma were travelling 
together) (ERRC, 2015). 
The discriminatory nature of these policies has been confirmed by the national authorities and 
courts as well. The Ombudsman confirmed that the Ministry of Interior limits the citizens’ right 
to freedom of movement because they belong to the Roma and Albanian community, i.e. it 
discriminates against them, in four consecutive annual reports, specifically those published in 
the period from 2012 to 2015.27 A representative of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
confirmed this and emphasised that at meetings with EU officials they were under significant 
pressure to limit the freedom of Roma to leave the country, since they were presumed to be 
                                                     
23 Telegram of the Ministry of the Interior, the text of which was quoted in the judgment in case no. ХХVIII П4-
1228/13 of the Skopje 2 First Instance Court, according to the legal opinion of the Macedonian Young Lawyers 
Association, http://tinyurl.com/hrzxpqa. 
24 Council of Europe, “Report by Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, following his 
visit to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, from 26 to 29 November 2012”, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=2052823&direct=true. 
25 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186589.pdf. 
26 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices for 2013, 2013 година, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220516.pdf. 
27 Ombudsman’s Office of the Republic of Macedonia, 2012 Annual Report of the Ombudsman’s Office, 
http://ombudsman.mk/upload/Godisni%20izvestai/GI-2012/GI-2012.pdf; 2013 Annual Report of the 
Ombudsman’s Office, http://ombudsman.mk/upload/Godisni%20izvestai/GI-2013.pdf; 2014 Annual Report of the 
Ombudsman’s Office, http://ombudsman.mk/upload/Godisni%20izvestai/GI-2014/GI%202014.pdf; 2015 Annual 
Report of the Ombudsman’s Office, http://ombudsman.mk/upload/Godisni%20izvestai/GI-2015/GI_2015-
za_pecat.pdf. 
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potential asylum seekers.28 This respondent explained that “despite the fact that we, as 
representatives of the institutions, objected to the pressure to reduce the number of asylum 
application[s] by preventing exit from the country, this was an issue regarding which [we] were 
not allowed any chance of negotiating”.29 The representative of the Ombudsman’s Office 
emphasised that the national authorities “refer to certain demands from Brussels and from EU 
Member States, such as Germany and France, which were affected by the largest number of 
asylum seekers at certain points in time, as well as Switzerland, but all these demands were 
made informally”.30 The national courts have also established discrimination in more than a 
dozen cases in which the plaintiffs were Roma who were denied the right to exit the country.31 
Yet, despite the confirmations of the Ombudsman and the court cases, in the specific period 
under analysis, the Commission did not regularly recognise the problem of profiling as a 
concern in its annual reports. Only in 2015 did the Commission note that "complaints have been 
registered by Roma prevented from leaving the country and of mistreatment of Roma who 
have returned after unsuccessfully seeking asylum abroad" (European Commission, 2015a). 
Three years later, in 2018, the Commission reflected on the issue again by noting that “no new 
cases were registered of Roma being prevented from leaving the country at its borders. Fifty 
(50) allegations for infringement of the right to equality entered in court proceedings” 
(European Commission, 2018b). 
The turning point at the national level was the statement of the interior minister in November 
2016, admitting this practice, emphasising that discrimination against Roma at border crossing 
points could not be allowed.32 The statement came during a period when the pressure from the 
Commission regarding this issue had significantly subsided, as underscored by the respondents. 
However, the issue could reappear on the agenda in some form or another. For example, 
neighbouring Serbia is required to “continue to take preventive measures against unfounded 
asylum requests by its citizens in EU Member States” as a conditional benchmark necessary to 
fulfil in order to close chapter 24 in the accession negotiations with the EU.33 Since North 
Macedonia very recently started with the screening of chapters 23 and 24, and given the 
                                                     
28 Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, May 2016. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Interview with a representative of the Ombudsman’s Office, August 2016. The formal recommendation for 
fulfilment of measures for reducing the number of asylum seekers was in fact a letter sent from Belgium to the 
European Commission. See L. Sommo, “EU Proposes Mechanism to Suspend Visa-Free Regime”, Balkan Insight 
[Online], 2011, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/eu-proposes-mechanism-to-suspend-visa-free-regime. 
31 See European Policy Institute & KHAM, “Right to Equality and Freedom of Movement at Borders: Experiences in 
Providing Legal Assistance”, Skopje and Delcevo, 2016, http://epi.org.mk/docs/Sloboda%20na%20dvizenje%20-
%20iskustva%20od%20pravna%20pomosh_MK.pdf . 
32 Ministry of the Interior, “Spasovski: The discrimination of Roma at border crossing points cannot be allowed”, 
Press Release, 2 November 2016, http://mvr.gov.mk/vest/2894. 
33 European Union Common Position, “Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security”, Conference on Accession to 
the European Union – Serbia, Brussels, 8.7.2016, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/AD-21-2016-
INIT/en/pdf. 
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learning processes in the European Commission, the same benchmark is likely to be included 
in this case as well. 
4. The alternative policy response: Opening up legal migration pathways in 
Germany 
Recognising the migratory pressures from the Balkans, and in view of the region’s accession 
perspective, policy research has argued for opening up of legal migration pathways as a more 
applicable policy response. In this respect, Guild has looked into the potential of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements, which include a mechanism to support economic 
migration by individuals – a right to movement for the purpose of self-employment (see Guild, 
2017). Yet, instead of using these agreements to assist neighbouring countries, Guild notes that 
“member states’ interior ministries have been left free to use exclusively coercive, non-entrée, 
refusal of admission and expulsion measures to block economic migration in the region” (ibid., 
p. 162). Following this example, in the aftermath of the coercive measures, in 2015 the German 
authorities responded by broadening the legal pathways for opening up the labour market as 
the road less travelled in the EU at the time. This was done through introducing a regulation 
(known as section 26.2 of the Beschäftigungsverordnung), which essentially opened the labour 
market for nationals from the six Western Balkan countries, without including minimum skill or 
qualification requirements (see Bither and Ziebarth, 2018). Following the introduction of this 
regulation, the number of asylum applications from the Western Balkans dropped, although it 
is difficult to draw clear conclusions as to its impact. 
5. Conclusions and recommendations  
This policy paper has examined the conflicting objectives of EU conditionality in relation to 
Roma in the aftermath of introducing visa-free travel for the Western Balkans, studying the 
case of North Macedonia. The paper has shown how the national authorities, in response to 
EU member state requests, have instituted practices at the national level that led to a violation 
of the rights of the Roma community, by limiting their freedom to exit the country. The paper 
has analysed both the EU and the national responses instituted through the post-visa 
liberalisation monitoring mechanism with the purpose of taking measures for decreasing the 
number of unfounded asylum seekers from the region to the EU. Analysing the EU response, 
the paper has shown that through the documents of the EU and its member states Roma have 
been singled out as a dominant community among the asylum seekers in parallel with the 
requirements for the national governments to limit the number of potential asylum seekers. 
Such conditions have at the national level been transposed into targeting and clear profiling of 
Roma upon exit, as demonstrated by the analysis of the national response, heavily criticised by 
national institutions, civil society and international organisations.  
In addition to violation of the rights of the Roma community already proven in the national 
courts and several ongoing procedures in front of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
practice discussed above carries significant implications for the role of EU conditionality in 
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acceding countries as well as the overall role of the EU in the world. In relation to the former, 
the request directed at acceding countries to grossly violate the rights of a specific community 
undermines the potential of the instrument of conditionality for the purposes of supporting the 
rule of law and good governance. As to the latter, the actions of member states in which such 
requests are put forward to third countries in effect undermines the role of the Union as a 
normative power supporting the values of human rights and democracy. In light of these 
findings, the paper puts forward the recommendations below. 
To the EU institutions and member states: 
• The European institutions (including Frontex and the European Commission) should avoid 
using terminology that can lead to stigmatising communities, specifically Roma, in their 
reports.  
• The EU member states should ensure non-discriminatory treatment of all asylum 
applicants.  
• The EU member states need to look into expanding legal pathways of migration for 
economic purposes.  
To the Macedonian authorities: 
• Ensure efficient investigation in cases of alleged racial discrimination and racially 
motivated, unlawful conduct by the border police. 
• Raise awareness among the border police about the principle of non-discrimination and 
its application.  
• Educate and raise the awareness of the Roma community about their civil rights, 
including in cases in which they are denied exit outside the national borders. 
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